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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

BYRON R. GRIFFITHS,

Plaintiff and Respondent)
vs.

Case No. 8154

SHIRLEY GRIFFITHS,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Byron R. Griffiths, the plaintiff and respondent, sued
his wife, Shirley, the defendant and appellant herein, for a
divorce. 'I rial was held June 24, 195 3, before IVIarcellus K.
Snow, sitting as Pro 1-1empore District Judge. Findings and
Decree awarding plaintiff a divorce were filed July 7, 1953.
Shirley filed a Motion for a New Trial and Motion to Amend
the Findings and Judgment, on July 16, 1953, v;hich were
denied February 4, 1954 (R. 101).
3
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The parties were married at Elko, Nevada, Decen1ber 6,
1943 (R-14). They have no children and accumulated no
property during the marriage.
They lived together as husband and wife, without benefit
of ceremonial marriage, for at least six years prior to their
formal marriage (R- 5) and there is evidence that they had
lived as man and wife since 1934 (R-35).
Plaintiff was drafted into the Army December 7, 1943, and
claimed he married Shirley, the day before his induction, in
order to protect her with an Army allotment and insurance
(R-15, 16).
After induction, the parties spent a short time together at
Camp Beal in 1944, where plaintiff was stationed before being
sent overseas (R-16). They carried on their marriage by correspondence during the war years. In 1946, after 17 months
overseas, plaintiff decided to ask defendant for a divorce, which
he did in a letter (R-18). While he was overseas defendant
corresponded with the plaintiff about twice each week in matters of love, affection and encouragement (R-17). Plaintiff's
desire for a divorce was based on conditions he asserted existed
prior to his marriage (R-18). Plaintiff left the service in March
1946 and for three months lived with Shirley as man and v.rife
(R-19, 20). At the end of the three-month period, he reenlisted in the army. During these three months plaintHf
claimed the parties were in periods of constant bickering (R-21,
22 and 23~). Defendant admits that there was some argument,
but that she was merely trying to persuade Byron to keep better
friends and associates, stop his drinking and cease vulgarity
(R-37-42). On re-enlistment in June 1946, Byron went to Camp
'\

4

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Lee, Virginia (R-25), was stationed there for over three years.
He went overseas again January 1951 (R-27). He filed his
divorce complaint November 13, 1952 (R-1) asserting grounds
of mental cruelty. He returned about one month before the
trial date (R-28).
Plaintiff admitted tn his ((Answers to Interrogatories"
(R- 5) that among other things, defendant threw up to him
the fact that she had contracted syphilis from the plaintiff prior
to their marriage, and during the period in which she co-habited
with him. This fact is further confirn1ed in defendant's
((.A.nswer" (Para. 5, R-9). *
Shirley Griffiths' Answer to her husband's Complaint
specifically denies that he had any groun~s for divorce and
set forth his own misconduct by way of recrimination. She
asserted that they had lived together for nine years prior to
their marriage (R-8) ; that there were some quarrels occasioned
by the plaintiff's laziness and habits with loose and immoral
friends and ((that she had provided for him during the first seven
years of their life together (prior to their formal marriage
ceremony), and that the plaintiff had impaired her health
through a venereal disease." (R-9). Defendant alleged and
testified (R-9) that Byron did not want her to go back with him
to Camp Lee following re-enlistment in June 1946 (R-38),
but that during this time, they wrote each other affectionately and planned for their future married life (R-39).
The plaintiff in his correspondence explained how uneconomical it \vould be for his wife to be with him, suggesting
that he v.:ould try to transfer to Hill Field in order to be to-

* Defendant-is still being treated

for this disease.

5
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gether (R-40, Exhibits D-2). These exhibits indicate an intention to remain married during this time. At this time, plaintiff
was actually living a dual life. He was living with another
woman, defendant named as one LaVerne Burton (R-45)
at Camp Lee, Virginia. Over strenuous objection (R-45), the
facts developed in the trial were there (R-65):

HQ. What did you find when you got there? (Mrs.
Griffiths)
A. It was about 10 after 7 in the morning, and I
knocked on the door and I knocked and no-one answered, and I looked in the window and my husband
was there in bed vvith this woman, and I knocked
again and she said n"'ho is it" and she came to the
door in this bathrobe and I said nmay I please see
my husband, Byron Griffiths" and then she slammed
the door in my face and when my husband came
out he said ({honey, you could cause us a lot of
trouble coming here'' and he pushed me down the
street and we walked.
Q. And then you two went down the street?
A. And you know the rest.
Q. Did you ask him anything about this lady who appeared at the door?
A. Yes.
Q. What did he say?
A. He said ({just the girl I spent the night \vith."

Q. Did he tell you her name?
A. Yes.
Q. What was it?
A. Well, at that time he didn't. He said it was Virginia
Godsby who I found was the lady who was renting
part of the house.
6
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Q. And did you later find out •vhat her name was?

A. Yes.
Q. What was that?

A. LaVerne Burton.
Q. \'Vas there anything else he said about tl1is LaVerne
Burton when you were walking around the block
with him?

A. Not at that time because we went do\vn to get a
hotel room. I still didn't know what it was all about.
Q. Then v1hat happened?

A. Well, he got me a hotel room and then he sent a
letter to my brother-in-law requesting that he request
him so that he could be transferred right away and
then he said he was on charge of quarters that night
which I found out wasn't right, and then he took
me to Washington, D. C. as fast as he could.
Q. And then when you returned, where did you go to
live?

A. To Richmond, Virginia, on West Franklin Street.

Q. How long did you stay there ?
A. I stayed there about a month before we had this
apartlnent at Hokeville.
Q. How long did you stay there?

A. Until September the 14th.
Q. What year?

A. 1947.

Q. And when did you go back there?
lL June the 14th, 1947.
Q. So you were back there for 90 days?
7
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A. Yes.
Q. During that time did Mr. Griffiths ever take you
over to Pittsburgh or Camp Lee?

A. Never.
Q. Did he tell you why?

A. He said he couldn't be seen on the streets because she
was known as his wife?
Q. Who was ((she"?

A. LaVerne Burton.
Q. Was there any discussion as to his relationship
with this LaVerne Burton?

A. In what way?
Q. As to their relationship?
A. Well, he just said he had been living with her and
that-well, I don't remember exactly what was said,
to tell you the truth, about her.
Q. But there was a discussion about them having lived
together?
A. Yes.
Q. And did you argue and quarrel while you were
back there at Hokeville, or in Virginia?
A. I didn't argue or quarrel with him any time because
he was like a person in dilemma. I didn't say a word
because I was very ill and there's a doctor back
there at Camp Lee that knows it. He lived in the
same apartment where we lived.
Q. Did you go out with him and meet many of his
friends?
A. No. When we went out, we got on the bus there
and would go to Richn1ond because he couldn't be
seen with 1ne.
8
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Q. When you say he couldn't be seen with you, how
did you know that?

A. Because he told me.
Q. Did you argue and quarrel about this?
A. No. I didn't even have enough gumption to argue
and quarrel.

Q. How did you feel when you found he was living
with this other woman?

A. Well, I went down to skin and bones, and was so
ill I couldn't hardly stand up.

Q. Why did you return to Salt Lake?
A. Because I felt like I was dying. That if I stayed
there, I would die there,

Q. What was causing you to feel like that?
A. T'he pressure and the nervous strain that I was under.

Q. What \vas causing that pressure and nervous strain?
A. Well, just the fact of what I found and her being
there, and you know how things are when something like that happens.

Q. And then did you return to Salt Lake ?
A. Yes, I returned to Salt Lake. After I returned from
back there, he had written me a letter requesting
me to show I had been there so he couldn't bring
in desertion against me.

Q. So you returned to Salt Lake at Mr. Griffiths'

re-

quest?
A. rfhat' s right-! had the letter signed.

Q. J\..nd you have lived in Salt Lake ever s1nce that
time?
lL 'That's right.

9
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Q. Since that time, has 1vir. Griffiths ever provided
you with living quarters so that you could be with
him?
A. He has not.

Q. Have you requested him to?
A. I did.

Q. And do you feel that if he would get out of the
army and live with you and resume your marriage, .
that you could make a go of this marriage?
A. Well, I think perhaps we could if he would cooperate with me, yes.

Q. Do you wish a divorce at this time ?
A. I do not. (To the Court) May I say something,
your Honor?
THE COURT: No.

Q. Now, did the affair with LaVerne Burton end at
that time?
A. No, it did not.

Q. Now, when did you hear from her again?
A. Well, the first time I heard from her, she wrote my
husband a letter when he can1e back from overseas.''
J)efendant' s version of the Camp Lee incident as presented
in his n1ain case commences at Page 46 of the Record.

((Q. As a matter of fact, you were there with a girl
by the name of LaVerne Burton, were you not?
A. Not alone.

Q. And she was there in a bathrobe, was. she not? Clad
in nothing but a bathrobe, is that right?
10
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A. I would say that I believe she had a bathrobe on.
Q. And when she came to the door and Mrs. Griffiths
announced who she was, LaVerne Burton slammed
the door in her face, did she not, and wouldn't let
her in?
A. No.
Q. Isn't that right?
A. No.
Q. And you got up and came out and dressed with
just your trousers on, is that right?
A. I had a shirt on also.
Q. And then you went out and walked around the
block, and Mrs. Griffiths asked you who that woman
was?
MR. BOSONE: We object to all of this going in the
record on the grounds heretofore made on all this
testimony.
THE COURT: Objection overruled.
Q. To aid your memory, Mr. Griffiths, did you say
((that's the v;oman I stayed with last night" ?
A. I don't recollect that, no.
Q. Would you say you didn't say it?
A. I \vould say I didn't say it, yes.

Q. After that time, you went over to an adjoining town
and got a room in the hotel for Mrs. Griffiths, did
you not? You went to Pittsburgh and got a room
in the hotel for her, isn't that right?

A. Yes.

Q. \vhat did

you quarrel about during those three

rnonths that she was back there?
11

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

A. I COll;ld prabably name 100 different things. It was
just about the same old thing.

Q. Did you quarrel about LaVerne Burton?
A. At times, probably.

Q. And who was LaVerne Burton?
MR. BOSONE: We object to that as being incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial and not within the
issue of proper cross-examination.
THE COURT: Objection overruled.
A. Just a woman of my acquaintance.

Q. What else did you quarrel about besides LaVerne
Burton?
A. I believe things that had happened here in Salt Lake
-the same old things kept coming up all the time.

Q. You went to Hokeville after that to live, did you
not?

A. Yes.
Q. Didn't you quarrel a great deal because you refused
to take Mrs. Griffiths to Pittsburgh to any social
activities?

A. Yes.
Q. And the reason you quarreled and wouldn't take her
there was because you told her LaVerne Burton
was known in Pittsburgh and in Camp Lee as your
wife, isn't that a fact?
A. Yes.
After Camp Lee, Shirley returned home and neither of
the parties lived with the other again as husband and wife.
Shirley Griffiths did not seek a divorce or counterclaim,

12
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but prayed the plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed, ((No cause
of action." She desired the status of the marriage continue for
reasons obvious to her.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION WAS AGAINST
THE LAW.
II. THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT T'O SUPPORT A FINDING IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF.

ARGUMENT

I
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION WAS AGAINST
THE LAW.
The basis of the Court's decision in this case seemed to be,
since the husband proved minor acts of mental cruelty by
his wife, and there was no desire on the husband's part for
the marriage, a divorce should be granted the husband notwithstanding the wife had the substantial grounds for divorce,
but did not desire a divorce.
Based on the evidence, the Trial Court's decision is shocking to one's sense of good conscience, justice and decency. It
n1ay be granted that some marriages are hopeless, impossible
and serve no social good and ought to be resolved by divorce,
nevertheless, the dissolution of such rnarriages ought not to

13
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be granted upon the complaint of so guilty a spouse. That
the wife herself desired no divorce and sought only to resist the
case of her husband was no basis for the Trial Court to con1pel one, merely because the marriage seemed to the Court
to be without worthy purpose and the husband proved nominal
grounds of mental cruelty.
The simple point raised by this appeal is, shall a husband
guilty of serious marital misconduct, be able to force a divorce,
on proof of mental cruelty, where the wife has the substantial
grounds, but elects to maintain the marriage status?
It is a rare situation in divorce actions where each spouse
is not frequently guilty to some degree. Where each party
claims mental cruelty or other minor grounds of incompatibility on the other, the Courts wisely have adopted the doctrine
that the party least at fault should be awarded the divorce.

It has been held in Alldredge vs. Alldredge, 229 Pac. 2d
681, that acts and conduct on the part of a husband may well
constitute cruelty to the wife when similar acts and conduct
on her part may not constitute cruelty to him. In Doe vs. Doe,
158 Pac. 781, the Court sadi:
(Before a decree is granted the husband on such
ground, it ought to be somewhat of an aggravated
case."
t

This holding has been approved also in Cordner vs. Cordner,
61 Pac. 2d 601.

The fact that both parties are frequent! y guilty of grounds
for divorce has led this Court to recognize the doctrine of
ncotnparative rectitude."

14
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In Hendricks vs. Hendricks} 257 Pac. 2d 366, this Court
I I I I lheld:
((To affirm that a guilty spouse is never entitled to
a divorce is a position difficult to apply to the facts of
life. It is seldom, perhaps never, that any wholly innocent party seeks a divorce against one who is wholly
guilty. Awareness of this fact and the giving of attention to the social implications of divorce has given rise
to various exceptions and limitations on the doctrine
of recrimination. A realistic approach is indicated by
the Court in the case of Dearth vs. Dearth, 15 At 2nd
37, wherein it concluded that where mutual delinquencies of husband and wife made further living intolerable, a divorce should be granted and the Court
was not called to balance such delinquencies, but only
to determine which party was least at fault in causing
the bad situation. This is based upon the doctrine of
'comparative rectitude' which is often used and has
been given tacit recognition by this Court."
Thus the rationale of the Hendricks decision seems to
be, grant a divorce to the party least at fault, where they are
mutually delinquent and where there appears to be no good
purpose for tolerating the marriage. However, the doctrine
of Hendricks should not be extended to aid the spouse guilty
of committing the serious misconduct.
In Hendricks this Court further said:

('In vievv of the fact that neither spouse is accused
of the cornmission of a felony, adultery, or any other
heinous offense, but the reciprocal claims rest upon
various acts and commissions alleged to constitute
cruelty to the other, the trial court would best perform
its function in the administration of justice by deter"
mining \Vhich party was least at fault .
15
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Bad conduct and poor taste produce bad decisions. An
objective review of Byron Griffiths' performance and record
here must find him guilty of the most serious misconduct.
While the record is sketchy, the implications are clear that
Shirley Griffiths supported and provided for Byron for some
6 years prior to their formal marriage, during the time they
lived as common law man and wife. She contracted a dread
social disease which he admitted having (R-36). Shirley desired to be his wife and wanted to follow him to army camps
where possible. Byron didn't want her there (R-38). Although Byron was at Camp Lee for three years, he kept company with the nother woman" since he arrived at Camp Lee
(R-83). He actually held out the nother woman" as his wife
to the community. Why Shirley Griffiths should want to preserve her marriage to this person is entirely up to her. The
effect of the Trial Court's decision is to compel her to accept
a divorce she does not want, to reward the guilty spouse
with divorce because Shirley refused to ask for divorce on her
own grounds.
Whatever the basis of the doctrine of ncomparative rectitude," the simple equitable rule of nclean hands" should
bar Byron Griffiths' action for divorce here.
In an interesting decision, Clark vs. Clark, 225 Pac. 2d
147, the New Mexico Supreme Court answers the questiop,
ndoes recrin1ination afford a valid defense in a suit for divorce
sought on the ground of incompatibility?" There, the husband
sought divorce on grounds of incompatibility. The wife plead
recrimination, but asked no affirmative relief. At the trial,
the wife offered to prove that plaintiff had committed repeated

16
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acts of adultery with a named co-respondent. The trial court
refused to allow her to present evidence of recrimination and
awarded the husband the divorce. In reversing the decision,
the New Mexico Supreme Court held:
((It would be absurd to say that incompatability itself
could be pleaded by way of recrimination as a defense
to a divorce sought on the ground of incompatability,
but as to other defenses traditionally employed by way
of recrimination, if plead, established and found to
h~ve resulted from acts of plaintiff, there resides in
the Trial Judge the discretion to see vvhether, :qotwithstanding such incompatibility, it shocks the conscience
to hold such plaintiff is entitled to a divorce by reason
thereof."
Judge Snow believed that mental cruelty once made out
by the husband mandatorily required him to grant a divorce
regardless of what had occasioned that mental cruelty, or how
guilty the plaintiff himself was, so long as the defendant had
not asked for affirmative relief and the marriage seemed hopeless. This may explain the Court's observation at Page 31
of the Record.
((THE COURT: It appears to the Court, as .far as
the evidence thus far presented to the Court is concerned, that \Ve have a plaintiff here v1ho is asking for
a divorce and the defendant is not contesting the di~
vorce. There is no money involved. As the Court sees
it at this point . . . "

17
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ARGUMENT
II

THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFICIENT TO SUPPORT
A FINDING IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF.
Divorce is an equitable action. A reviewing Court on
appeal has the duty and power to determine the facts for itself.
Alldredge vs. Alldredge, 229 Pac. 2d 681.
The Trial Court's findings should be upset when the record
shows such findings are clearly against the weight of the evidence. Doe vs. Doe, 158 Pac. 781, Cordner vs. Cordner, 61 Pac.
2d 601.
Since divorce is an equitable action, the record may disclose conditions under which the court should exercise its
sound discretion in either granting or wit_hholding relief and
in determining the extent thereof. Anderson vs. Anderson,
138 Pac. 2d 252.
This case presents a situation where, upon reviewing and
weighing all the evidence, this Court should substitute its
judgment for that of the Trial Court. One has only to read
the findings of fact to recognize how thin is the basis of the
plaintiff's Complaint and how vainly his pleadors strain to
ground a basis for support of the Court's judgment.
Consider paragraph 9 of the Findings of Fact (R-95):
((The Court finds that any ccndonation the plaintiff
may have extended to the defendant v1as nullified by
defendant's subsequent acts and conduct of cruelty."
18
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This finding implies that Shirley Griffiths' guilt, if any,
was not erased by the parties living together for the 90 days
after the Camp Lee incident because of Shirley's actions during
those 90 days. Such a finding is clearly against the law, and
insufficient in evidence where the plaintiff's own guilt is so
apparent and where the plaintiff's own misconduct obviously
caused defendant's attitude toward her husband during that
period.
Paragraph 10 of the Findings (R-95) alleges:
!(The Court finds that any acts of cruelty or other,vise
on behalf. of the plaintiff toward defendant up to the
time the parties resumed living together in Virginia
(Camp Lee) in 1947 were fully condoned by defendant
and not thereafter revived."
In view of the evidence, such a finding is totally unsupported and completely inconsistent with the record.
Paragraph 11 of the Findings (R-95) further recites:
u-rhe Court finds that the defendant was given the
opportunity before the Court to amend her pleadings
and counterclaim for a divorce, but the defendant refused to so amend the pleadings and seek a divorce,
even after all the evidence was in and she was again
afforded said opportunity by the Court."
I

In effect, plaintiff's findings concede that on the basis
of all the evidence, the defendant was the one "rho was entitled to divorce, but since she refused to seek a divorce, that
in itself becomes some grounds to grant a guilty husband the
divorce. This concept raises for the first time a doctrine by
default that although a divorce is conte~ted by the party 'vho
has the substantial grounds, she must nevertheless be cornpelled
19
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to take a divorce she does not wish, if having grounds she
refuses to counterclaim on her own behalf.

CONCLUSION
It is submitted that the Trial Court's decision was against
the law and founded upon insufficient and inconsistent evidence
and findings. Defendant respectfully urges this Court to re·
verse the decision and enter judgment in favor of the defendant
and against the plaintiff, no cause of action on plaintiff's
Complaint. Defendant further prays that she be awarded the
sum of $350.00, a reasonable attorney's fee and her costs in
order to pursue this appeal.
Respectfully submitted this 8th day of May, 1954.
A. W. SANDACK

Attorney for Defendant and Appellant
1122 Continental Bank Building

Salt Lake City, Utah
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